Suicide and property rights in India

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A B S T R A C T
This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male and female suicide rates in India. Using state level variation in legal changes to women’s property rights, we show that better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in the difference between female and male suicide rates, but an increase in both male and female suicides. We conjecture that increasing female property rights increased conflict within household and this increased conflict resulted in more suicides among both men and women in India. Using individual level data on domestic violence we find evidence that increased property rights for women did increase the incidence of wife beating in India. A model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetric information and costly conflict is consistent with these findings.

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1. Introduction

Suicide rates in India have increased steadily over the last few decades. The WHO estimates that there were 190,000 adult suicide deaths in India in 2010 alone. Suicide has become the second leading cause of death among young Indians — it is the cause of twice as many deaths as HIV/AIDS and almost the same number as maternal deaths in young women (Patel et al., 2012). This paper studies the impact of female property rights on male and female suicide rates in India. Using state level variation in legal changes to women’s property rights, we show that better property rights for women are associated with a decrease in the difference between female and male suicide rates, but an increase in both male and female suicides. The large majority of suicide victims in India are married and the broad class of ‘family problems’ is the main reported cause of suicide for both men and women. Using a simple model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetric information, we show how strengthening women’s inheritance rights can raise intra-household conflict and increase suicide rates. In line with the recent literature on the economics of the family, our theoretical model assumes that cooperation in a marriage can generate some gains and that spouses bargain over the allocation of consumption in the household under the threat of separation (divorce or ‘separate spheres model’ a la Lundberg and Pollak (1993)). To this basic framework, we add two elements: asymmetry of information and costly conflict. Private information can generate delays and bargaining failure. Hence, we follow Bloch and Rao (2002) and assume that husbands and wives derive some private value of their union that is not known to their spouse. Moreover, we aim to capture the idea that conflict is an integral part of the bargaining process. When an offer (regarding the division of resources) is rejected, conflict ensues. Threatening separation does create an atmosphere of discord within the household that comes at a cost, and separation cannot be achieved instantaneously. At any point though, individuals may instead choose the ultimate exit and commit...
suicide. Hence, separations and suicides are predicted by the model.\textsuperscript{6} We show that a pro-women redistribution of resources often increases the likelihood of conflict between husband and wives, in which case male suicide increases and the ratio of female to male suicide rates decreases.

Consistently, we provide suggestive evidence that marital discord may be the main channel through which improving female property rights raises suicides. We show that the state changes that strengthen female property rights for women are associated with an increase in the suicide rate from family problems but have no significant impact on suicides from other causes. Moreover, using alternative individual level data, which contains measures of domestic violence, we find evidence that increased property rights for women did increase the incidence of wife beating in India. This is consistent with our hypothesis that increasing female property rights increased conflict within household and it is this increased conflict which resulted in more suicides among both men and women in India.

There is a large sociological literature in sociology, following Durkheim's (1897) ground breaking work, studying empirically the relationship between marriage and suicides has been much, though the topic has been mostly ignored in economics.\textsuperscript{7} This sociological literature has long recognized the tendency for higher suicide rates, for both men and women, to be associated with increased equality across the sexes. It emphasizes how increased opportunities for women can accentuate tensions and marital discord within households, by challenging traditional roles, increasing the importance of negotiation and raising the potential for conflict. There are numerous empirical accounts investigating the possible consequences of female empowerment on suicides. For example, in the United States, Stack (1987) found a positive relationship between the labor force participation of wives and both the male and female suicide rates over the period 1948–1963, when antipathy towards female labor participation prevailed; and a smaller, but still positive relationship, with male suicide rates over the 1964–1980 period when female labor participation was more widely accepted.\textsuperscript{8} Similarly, cross-country studies find a concave effect of female labor participation on the female to male suicide ratio and a positive correlation between the UNDP's Gender Empowerment Measure (a measure of women's access to social, political, and economic power) and suicide rates for both women and men (Pampel, 1998).\textsuperscript{9} In China, the marriage law in 1950 that granted women the right to choose their own partners, demand a divorce, inherit property, and control of their children, might have resulted in an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 suicides and murders of women between 1950 and 1953 (Das Gupta et al., 2000).\textsuperscript{10}

Economists and sociologists have studied and found conflicting information on the association between violence and women's empowerment, particularly in terms of economic opportunity, control of assets and social group participation. In India for instance, some studies find that women with greater economic resources, such as ownership of land or employment were less likely to report violence (for example, Panda and Agarwal, 2005), while in others, employed women have been found to report violence more frequently than unemployed women, and this is despite the higher income resulting from female employment (see for example, Eswaran and Malhorta 2011). Likewise, Luke and Munshi (2011) find that when women in the tea plantations in South India earn a higher share of the household income, the probability of marital violence increases. In the context of Progresa in Mexico, Bobonis et al. (2013) and Bobonis (2011) find that although women in recipient households were significantly less likely to be victims of physical abuse than women in comparable non-beneficiary households, they were more likely to be victims of emotional violence and more likely to separate.

To be sure, this paper is not suggesting that improving female property rights is undesirable. Until recently, women have been excluded from land rights in many societies and their ability to inherit property has largely been restricted. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that improving women's asset ownership, relative income, or ability to control land impacts the intra-household allocation of resources towards children (among others Lundberg et al., 1997; Duflot and Udry, 2004; Bobonis, 2009). That improvements in women's relative position in the household can be desirable, not only on equity, but also on efficiency grounds is a frequent justification for policies targeting women, such as microcredit and conditional cash transfers. Moreover, there is evidence that making inheritance laws more egalitarian between sons and daughters has had desirable consequences in India. For example, Roy (2013) and Deininger et al. (2013) show that the legal changes to women's property rights that we consider here increased daughters' likelihood to inherit land, women's age at marriage and the educational attainment of daughters.\textsuperscript{11}

Our model predicts that women's expected welfare rises due to increased female property rights. When wives contribute a greater proportion of the total family wealth, they do no longer accept any allocation offered by their husbands. Women expect, and are more likely to get, a more equitable share of consumption. However, as a consequence of these higher expectations, conflict within the household can rise and result in higher suicide rates for both men and women.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical model linking female property rights and suicides. Section 3 discusses the changes in female property rights that we study and Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 contains our empirical analysis. Section 6 provides further discussion and Section 7 concludes.

2. A model of household conflict

This section presents a model of intra-household bargaining with asymmetry of information that captures the idea that, within a household, arguing is akin to starting a conflict. While bargaining and conflict are most often studied separately or as alternatives, there is a burgeoning literature that recognizes that conflict is often an intrinsic part of bargaining (see Sanchez-Pages, 2009 and the signaling models of domestic violence of Bloch and Rao (2002) and Bobonis (2013)).

In our model, husbands and wives can use their resources to generate a surplus, and they bargain over its allocation. As is common in the literature on intra-household bargaining, who owns the resources in the household matters by affecting the outside options of the spouses.\textsuperscript{12} In order for bargaining to fail some of the time, we assume that spouses derive some private satisfaction with the marriage, whose magnitude is unknown to their partner. But what is distinct in this model is that we assume that when an offer is rejected, marital discord or conflict ensues. This comes at a cost to each spouse, and a cost whose magnitude is realized only at the time of the conflict. Separation cannot be achieved without going through a period of marital conflict. In contrast, suicide, the ultimate exit, can be achieved instantaneously.

\textsuperscript{6}Our analysis will focus on suicides as the outcome of interest since separation and divorce are extremely rare in the Indian context and we have no data which speak to this issue. In Ligon et al.'s (2004) dynamic model of bargaining, where divorce and suicide can occur, a key assumption is that there is a strong advantage to being the one leaving the other that can create a prisoner dilemma type of situation. When the marriage surplus is small (due to a shock), this preemptive advantage can make it impossible for the couple to stay together. If now one of the party prefers committing suicide than staying alone, suicide would result. However, it is not clear that such a preemptive advantage exists in the case of India.

\textsuperscript{7}Ligon et al. (2004) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) being two exceptions.

\textsuperscript{8}Similar relationships are found for Canada (Trovato and Vos, 1992).

\textsuperscript{9}Mayer (2003) finds similar correlations in India using state-wide variation in gender-related development indexes.

\textsuperscript{10}Suicides of married women and men as a response to family conflict are a common occurrence particularly in developing countries. Canetto (2008) discusses the cultural ramifications of suicide — that relative to developed countries, where suicidal behavior tends to be interpreted as a symptom of individual mental health, in poorer countries, suicide is often considered a normal, albeit last resort response, to a serious family conflict.

\textsuperscript{11}See also Brule (2012) and Rosenblum (forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{12}In the `unitary' model of the household, who owns the resources does not affect any of the household choices. This model has been empirically rejected in most contexts.
This choice of modeling aims at capturing, or at least accommodat-
ing, the main views on suicide. Leenaars (1996) provides a useful over-
view of the psychological perspective on suicide and of Schneidman’s work.13 Both authors point to a lack of coping responses among people
who attempt or commit suicide. A recent traumatic event can be identi-
ﬁed in many suicides. In particular, suicide is linked to events involving
loss or conﬂict in existing interpersonal relationships. However, it is not
simply the stress or even the pain, but the person’s inability to cope with
the event or pain. The common stimulus in suicide is undenurda-
psychological pain. The person may feel any number of emotions but it is
the feeling of being hopeless—helpless that is particularly painful for
many suicidal people. The situation is unbearable and the person des-
perately wants a way out of it, an exit. The suicide is functional because
it abolishes painful tension for the individual. It provides relief from suf-
f ering. Schneidman identiﬁed cognitive constriction (i.e., rigidity in
thinking, narrowing of focus, tunnel vision) as a common cognitive state among those who die by suicide, preventing individuals in pain
from perceiving ways to end the pain other than death.

Hence, we think of the cost of conﬂict in our model as the psychological
and or physical pain that the spouses do endure during an episode of mar-
tial discord. Its magnitude is uncertain ex-ante since it depends on many
factors, including their ability to cope and put weight on the future. When
the pain is too acute, individuals may choose to commit suicide to end it.

2.1. Preferences

The preferences of husbands and wives depend on the status of their
marriage. If the marriage is intact, both spouses enjoy the household resources,
and some surplus is generated. Moreover we follow Bloch and Rao
(2002), Friedberg and Stern (2010) and Bobonis, Castro and Gonzalez-
Brenes (2013), in assuming that each has a personal level of satisfaction
with the marriage that is private information. Speciﬁcally, we assume that preferences can be represented by the utility functions

\[ V^h(I_h + I_w, x, \theta_h) \land V^w(I_h + I_w, x, \theta_w), \]

(1)

where \( I_h, I_w \) represents the resources of the husband and wife, 
\( x \) indicates how pro-wife the division of non-public goods are within
the household, and \( \theta \) for \( j \in \{h, w\} \) is the husband and wife’s private level of
satisfaction with the marriage. These satisfaction levels are independent and each follows a distribution \( G_j(\theta) \).14 \( V^w \) and \( V^h \) are strictly
increasing in income and personal satisfaction, and weakly concave in income.
Moreover, \( V^w \) is strictly increasing and concave in \( x \) while \( V^h \) is strictly
decreasing and convex in \( x \), \( \partial^2 V^w(I, x, \theta_w)/\partial x \geq 0 \) and \( \partial^2 V^h(I, x, \theta_h)/\partial x \leq 0 \), where \( I = I_h + I_w \).

If the husband and wife separate or revert to “separate spheres”
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1993), their preferences change and are given by the following utilities

\[ U^h(I_h) \land U^w(I_w), \]

(2)

where \( U^h \) and \( U^w \) are strictly increasing and concave. Given that divorce
is quasi-inexistent in this context, the separate spheres refer to a nonco-
operative equilibrium within the marriage.15

13 Schneidman is considered to be the “father” of suicidology who pioneered the use of
hotlines as a means of suicide prevention.

14 Adding a joint component to the satisfaction in the marriage that is known to both
parties would not affect the analysis.

15 Ofﬁcial ﬁgures on the divorce rate are unavailable but experts say that, despite being
rapidly increasing in urban areas, in 2010 only roughly 11 Indian marriages in every 1,000
end in divorce (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10284416).

2.2. Timing

Once a husband and wife are married, they each learn their personal
levels of satisfaction with the marriage. The husband then makes an
offer \( x \) to his wife. If the wife accepts, all is well and they enjoy utilities
\( V^w \) and \( V^h \) in Eq. (1). If she refuses, it triggers marital discord or con-
ﬂict within the household. This means that both husband and wife incur
(costs of conﬂict) \( \kappa_h \) and \( \kappa_w \) drawn from a distribution \( F \) (where \( F \) indicates
the marginal distribution for \( j \in \{h, w\} \) before separating or
reverting to their separate spheres and enjoying utilities \( U^h \) and \( U^w \) in
Eq. (2). At any point in this process, individuals may instead choose to
exit: end the pain and commit suicide.

To be sure, this is an extremely simpliﬁed model of conﬂict and
bargaining. It allows us to illustrate our point while avoiding the mul-
plicity of equilibria that would arise due to signaling in multiple rounds
of bargaining.

2.3. Decisions

Working backwards, consider a situation where a wife has rejected
her husband’s offer. This refusal initiates conﬂict within the household,
and husband and wives observe their costs of conﬂict \( \kappa_h \) and \( \kappa_w \). Her
utility will be \( U^w(I_w) - \kappa_w \) unless she kills herself, in which case she
gets 0. Hence, she stays alive if \( \kappa_w \leq U^w(I_w) \). Similarly, the husband
ends his days if \( \kappa_h > U^h(I_h) \), and otherwise gets utility \( U^h(I_h) - \kappa_h \).
Note that these expressions assume that \( x \) captures the cost of dealing with
a spouse or the cost of dealing with the spouse’s suicide. This assump-
tion simpliﬁes the analysis by removing any strategic (and probably un-
realistic) element to the decision of suicide.

It follows that, if the wife rejects an offer, her expected utility is given by

\[ E^w(I_w) = \int \kappa dF_w(\kappa), \]

(3)

while her husband’s expected utility is

\[ E^h(I_h) = \int \kappa dF_h(\kappa). \]

(4)

Hence, a wife accepts an offer \( x \) if:

\[ V^w(I_w) \geq E^w(I_w), \]

(5)

where \( I = I_w + I_h \).

Let \( \bar{\theta}(x) \) be the value of \( \theta_w \) so that inequality (5) holds with equality.

\[ G_w[\bar{\theta}(x)] \]

is the probability that an offer \( x \) is rejected.

The husband chooses an offer \( x \) that maximizes his expected utility

\[ \left(1 - G_w[\bar{\theta}(x)] \right) V^h(x, \bar{\theta}_h) + G_w[\bar{\theta}(x)] E^h(I_h). \]

(6)

Let \( x^*(\theta_h) \) denote the solution to this problem. If the solution is interior,
it is characterized by

\[ \left(1 - G_w[\bar{\theta}(x)] \right) \frac{\partial V^h(I, x, \theta)}{\partial x} - \frac{\partial G_w[\bar{\theta}(x)]}{\partial x} \left(V^h(I, x, \theta_h) - E^h(I_h)\right) = 0. \]

(7)

2.4. Pro-women redistribution

We are interested in the effect of changes in property rights that in-
crease women’s resources and decrease men’s resources. To be sure,
such changes would affect not only bargaining within households but
the marriage market as well. However, in a society where there are
many households of different wealth levels, each having a boy and a
girl, if assortative matching between the families results, men would marry women of the same wealth as their sister. Hence, a pro-women change in property rights would result in a one-to-one transfer of wealth between partners. Consequently, when studying the effect of a pro-women redistribution of wealth, we consider an increase in $I_w$ by $\tau$ that is exactly compensated by an equivalent decrease in $I_h$.

**Proposition 1.** When suicide rates are positive, a pro-women redistribution of resources decreases the ratio of female to male suicide rates.

**Proof.** Suicides rates consist of the probability of conflict times the probability of committing suicide in the case of conflict. Accordingly, the female suicide rate $S_f$ is given by

$$S_f = \int G_w(\theta(x')) (1 - F_w[U^w(I_w)]) dG_h(\theta_h),$$

and the male suicide rate is given by

$$S_m = \int G_w(\theta(x')) (1 - F_h[U^h(I_h)]) dG_h(\theta_h).$$

The female to male ratio, $S_f/S_m$, decreases if $\ln S_f - \ln S_m$ decreases, that is $dS_f/dS_m < 0$. This is clearly the case as

$$\frac{dS_f}{S_f} = \frac{d}{d\theta} \left( \int G_w(\theta(x')) dG_h(\theta_h) \right) \frac{d\theta_h}{d\theta} = \frac{f_w[U^w(I_w)] - f_h[U^h(I_h)]}{1 - F_w[U^w(I_w)]} U^\theta(I_w),$$

and

$$\frac{dS_m}{S_m} = \frac{d}{d\theta} \left( \int G_w(\theta(x')) dG_h(\theta_h) \right) \frac{d\theta_h}{d\theta} = \frac{f_h[U^h(I_h)] - f_h[U^h(I_h)]}{1 - F_h[U^h(I_h)]} U^\theta(I_h).$$

To be sure, the effect of a pro-women redistribution of wealth on the suicide rates for both genders is ambiguous. Of crucial importance is the effect of a pro-women redistribution on the likelihood of conflict. If conflict increases, the suicide rate of men increases while the suicide rates of women can move in either direction.

Why is a pro-women redistribution likely to increase conflict? Assume that $\frac{1 - G_w(\theta)}{G_h(\theta)}$ is decreasing in $\theta$. And let's call surplus the difference between the utility in a peaceful marriage and the utility once separated, that is

$$\Delta_i = V^i(I, x, \theta_i) - E^i(I), \quad \text{for } i \in \{h, w\}.$$

A decrease in conflict requires that the increase in $x'$ following a pro-women distribution is sufficiently high to increase the wife's surplus (it more than compensates the increase in her outside option); but for such an increase to satisfy the first order condition (7), the husband's surplus needs also to increase. Whether it is even possible for both surpluses to increase and conflict to decrease depends on the utility function and the distributions. The following subsection shows us when conflict increases with linear utilities.

### 2.5. Linear utilities

In what follows, we suppose that utilities are linear:

$$V^\omega(I, x, \theta_w) = x\beta + \theta_w \quad \& \quad V^i(I, x, \theta_h) = (1 - x)\beta + \theta_h$$

and that $\theta^w$ and $\theta^h$ are uniformly distributed between $0$ and $\Pi$.

When wives own nothing, they would accept anything. It follows that husbands offer $x = 0$ and initially there is no conflict.

If the surplus generated by cooperation in the marriage is small compared with the range of private satisfaction from the marriage ($b - 1) < \theta$, husbands with low valuations offer to keep all the joint gain from the marriage as long as women's share of wealth is low enough. As a result, conflict necessarily rises over this interval. Women's outside options have improved so they now refuse some offers but their prospects are still bad enough that they might commit suicide if the cost of conflict turns out to be too high.

As we keep on raising women's share of wealth, the share offered to wives $x$ keeps on rising and conflict decreases as women and men are becoming more equal and then increases again as women become richer. Naturally, men with a very high satisfaction from the marriage make offers that their wives accept for sure.

This is illustrated in the example that follows. We set $b = 1.2, \theta = 50$ and $U(I) = I$ for $j \in \{h, w\}$. The private satisfaction from the marriage $\omega^w$ and the costs of conflict are assumed to be independent and follow a Pareto distribution ($\xi = 0.5$ and $\alpha = 1.1$).

We set the total resources at $I = 100$ and progressively raise the level of resources owned by the wife $\omega^w$ from 1 to 99. Fig. 1 shows the consequence of a pro-women redistribution on the likelihood of conflict and on the suicide rates of men and women. These are averaged over the different realizations of the levels of private satisfaction. We see that the likelihood of conflict rises over a large range of the division of assets. To be sure the vast majority of conflicts result in separations. However, for some, conflict is too painful and they choose to commit suicide rather than wait for the separation outcome. Individual's utility under a separation depends on their resources, so that redistribution improves the outcome of a separation for women and makes it less attractive for men. As a result, an increase in conflict is always associated with an increase in male suicides, and sometimes with an increase in female suicides. When conflict decreases, female suicides decline. The female to male suicide ratio declines throughout.

We now turn to an empirical analysis of the link between some specific instances of pro-women redistributions of resources in India and the suicide rates of men and women. We first describe the measures of pro-women redistribution of resources, female inheritance and land rights, that are used in the estimations.

### 3. Female property rights in India

Under traditional Hindu law, women had almost no rights to property ownership. Since 1956, the property rights for all Hindus have been governed by the Hindu Succession Act. Hindus in the Act include Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists, and the Act applies to all states except Jammu and Kashmir — covering 86% of the Indian population. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was aimed at unifying the existing legal doctrines guiding succession and establishing a law of succession whereby sons and daughters would enjoy similar property rights. While the Act significantly enhanced women's inheritance rights (Agarwal, 1994), two major sources of inequalities remained: the Act exempted joint family property and tenancy rights.

Traditional Hindu Law (dating from the 12th century) distinguished between two types of property: joint family property versus separate property. The former is inherited ancestral property, the latter is purchased or inherited from persons other than father (grandfather, great grandfather, ...). If a man has no sons, his share of ancestral property became his separate property. Under the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, only the separate property of males devolves equally upon sons and daughters. Since 1956, some states amended the Act so that both sons and daughters also have right to joint family property (Kerala in 1976; Andhra Pradesh in 1986; Tamil Nadu in 1989; Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994). In other states, men remained the sole coparceners in joint family property until 2005. Under the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005, all daughters, including married daughters, are coparceners in joint family property. In the empirical estimations that follow, we will be exploiting, these differences across states prior.

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16 Tribal communities of the north-eastern states are governed by customary law instead (mainly uncodified).

17 Also widows and mothers.
The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was a part of the codification and reform of Hindu personal law which followed Indian Independence. It was an attempt to unify different traditional schools of law which not only varied from region to region but sometimes by caste within regions. Prior to the Act of 1956, inheritance laws were governed by two main schools of Hindu law, Mitakshara and Daydbhaga. The Mitakshara school prevailed in most of India, whereas the Daydbhaga school held in Bengal and Assam. Within the Mitakshara school, there were also four different sub-schools: Dravida (Madras) School in South India, Maharashtra (Bombay) School, Banaras School in Orissa and Bihar, and Mithila School in Uttar Pradesh. These different sub-schools differed with regards to their succession laws; the Madras and Bombay sub-schools in particular were somewhat more liberal with regards to recognizing the rights of women (Halder and Jaishankar, 2008). This being said, none of these traditional schools gave equal inheritance rights to men and women and the 1956 Act was an improvement over all of them. Nevertheless, due to these inherent differences across the traditional schools of law, passing the Act in 1956 turned out to be a huge challenge and subject to much debate at the time (Kishwar, 1994). It was by far the most controversial part of the reform to Hindu personal law. The original provisions on succession, framed by the B.N. Rau committee and piloted by Ambedkar in 1947, incorporated the concept of daughters as coparceners in joint family property. These proposals met with a storm of opposition who were not in favor of daughters inheriting property from their natal families at the cost of their brothers. Consistent with the regional differences in the traditional schools of law, it was the northern states who dismissed the more liberal ideas of the southern states, and by a majority vote, the proposed clauses, allowing equal inheritance rights to women, were removed from the Act and the traditional laws were maintained in this regard.

Given this background, it comes as no surprise that the five states which later introduced amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 were those whose traditional schools of law (the Madras and Bombay sub-schools) were more liberal and also those who agreed to the inclusion of female inheritance rights at the time of passage of the original act but who were shot down in parliament at the time. These later state level amendments included precisely the original provisions framed by the committee in 1947 but were removed from the Act of 1956. This being said, there does not appear to be any systematic reason for the specific years in which these different states enacted their amendments (Kerala in 1976; Andhra Pradesh in 1986; Tamil Nadu in 1989; Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994). In our empirical analysis, we will be including year and state fixed effects in our estimations. Therefore, the variation we are exploiting is the specific timing of these amendments within each state. We will demonstrate that the timing of these amendments is not correlated with other laws which pertain directly to women. That is, we will demonstrate that our results do not seem to be driven by other confounding changes such as the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Protection from Domestic Violence Act, the State Commission for Women Act, and political reservations for women.

As a further robustness test that it is the change in female property rights which are affecting suicide rates, the regional differences in traditional laws allow for an alternative source of variation in female property rights which we can explore. An additional shortfall of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 is that it does not cover land ownership stemming from tenancy rights. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 brought all agricultural land on par with other property. But prior to 2005, state tenurial laws governed tenancy rights and several states specified an order of devolution that strongly favors men. Additional laws which governed land ownership in India pertain to landholding restrictions. These landholding limits were defined per family unit, and the states vary in their definition of the family, where in some states daughters receive no recognition at all. Agarwal (1995) discusses the gender inequalities implicit in these state-level land and tenancy reform acts prior to 2005. Using this state level variation in the legal treatment of women with regards to land and tenancy reforms, we will construct alternative measures of pro-female property reforms to use in our empirical analysis.

4. Data

The data for the annual suicides for men and women in each state come from the National Crime Records Bureau of India. The data are available starting in the year 1967 through to the present. Police are expected to investigate all suspected suicides and the final verdict to determine cause of death is then passed to and reviewed by local government officials. The most common means of suicide adopted in India – the ingestion of poison (35%), usually agricultural pesticides, and

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18 These differences primarily pertain to the definition of stridhan (the part of the dowry that is the property of brides) and not inheritance laws.

19 In some states, the definition of tenant was so broad as to encompass most agricultural land.

20 Official suicide rates are then estimated off a sample of the population.
hanging (32%) account for nearly 70% of suicides (Mayer and Ziaian, 2002) – ensure that a substantial amount of cases will come to the attention of the police. Nevertheless, suicides are likely under-reported — for one, suicide is illegal in India. Substantial under-reporting is confirmed by detailed epidemiological studies that find, in some areas, suicide rates are as much as four to six times higher than the official rates (Gajalakshmi and Peto, 2007; Joseph et al., 2003; Soman et al., 2009). However, the general patterns of suicide rates in the official data that we will be focusing on in our analysis match those found in these more detailed micro-level analyses. Of particular relevance to our work, roughly the same female to male suicide ratio is found. Moreover, our empirical strategy will be to examine variation in suicide rates across time and state. In particular, we will be exploiting the impact of a legal change in female property rights which varies by state and year in India on annual suicide rates of men and women. In our estimations, we will be controlling for year and state fixed effects, therefore the under-reporting of suicide rates could only be biasing our results if this under-reporting is systematically correlated with one particular legal change across the states.

As discussed, the legal changes we focus on are Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, which vary by year and state until 2005, when the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act of 2005 was implemented throughout the country. Our period of analysis is therefore, 1967 (the first year that the suicide data are available) to 2004. Suicide rates over this period are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix. Average suicide rates are 11 and 7.3 (per 100,000) for men and women respectively. The male to female suicide rate ratio for the entire period is 1.5. This ratio is much lower than for most Western countries (where it is usually three time as large), and it is close to 1 for the age group 15–29.

For all of our control variables, we use panel data for fifteen major Indian states over the period 1967–2004. Table A1 in the Appendix provides means and standard deviations for the main variables used in the paper. These variables are averaged over the entire period. The data sources are described in more details in the Appendix.

5. Empirical analysis

5.1. Basic results

Our first set of estimations examines the effect of Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, which vary by state and year, on male and female suicide rates. As discussed in Section 3, since 1956 some states amended the Act so that both sons and daughters have the right to joint family property (Kerala in 1976; Andhra Pradesh in some states amended the Act so that both sons and daughters have

where $S_{it}^F$ refers to either the suicide rate of females ($i = F$) or males ($i = M$), per 1000 individuals (of group $i$), in state $s$ and year $t$. $X_{it}$ includes a set of state and time varying controls. These include population shares of Muslims, Hindus, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes; and economic factors such as literacy, relative female to male literacy, food prices, state income per capita, rural food production, yields, the incidence of floods or droughts, average rainfall, banks per capita, urbanization, and share of state expenditure on health, development and education. $A_{it}$ is our key variable of interest. It is equal to 1 if state $s$, in year $t$, has already passed an Amendment Act which increased inheritance rights to women and 0 otherwise (refer to the Appendix for details on the construction of this variable). $\lambda_s$ and $\gamma_t$ are the state and year fixed effects respectively, and $\epsilon_{it}$ is a regression disturbance term clustered at the state level.

Fixed effects at the state level control for the usual array of cross state differences in history, family and economic structure that have been constant over our sample period, while the year effects cover macro-shocks, trends in female empowerment and policies enacted by the central government that affect suicide rates.

Table 1 presents the regression estimates of Eq. (10). Columns 1 and 5 show that, controlling for state and year fixed effects (as well as economic and cultural controls), the Amendments are associated with an increase of 1 suicide (per 100,000) for female and 4 (per 100,000) for males (recall the average suicide rate is 7.3 and 11 (per 100,000) for women and men respectively).

We also estimate Eq. (10) for relative female to male suicide rates. We use two measures: the simple difference ($S^F_{it} - S^M_{it}$) and also the ratio ($S^F_{it}S^M_{it}$), which implicitly takes into account state and annual variation in the overall suicide rate. Columns 1 and 5 in Table 2 report the results from these estimations. We see, that the Amendments significantly reduce both of these relative measures. That is, although both male and female suicide rates increase with the Amendments (as seen in columns 1 and 5 in Table 1), male suicide rates increase by more. Controlling for state and year fixed effects as well as economic and cultural variables, we see (from Column 5 of Table 2) that the Amendment decreases the female to male suicide ratio by 0.10 (where the average of this ratio is 0.74).

We might expect that the longer a given law has been in place, the higher the awareness is and the more frequently it is enforced. To examine these effects, we use the following estimating equations:

$$ S^F_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 A_{it} + \lambda_s + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it} $$

where $d(exposure = y)_{st}$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when there has been $y$ years of exposure to the amendment in state $s$ and year $t$.

Fig. 2 plots the coefficients $\gamma_t$ from estimating Eq. (11) with economic and cultural controls as well as year and state fixed effects. We see that both male and female suicide rates are increasing in the number of years since the Amendment has been passed and that relative female to male suicides are decreasing in this variable. We do not find evidence of these effects abating with time. That is, there is no evidence of a concave relationship between suicides and years since the Amendment has been passed. In addition, we see no evidence that suicide rates started increasing prior to the passage of the Amendments.

As suggested by Fig. 2, another set of estimations, reported in Table A3 in the Appendix, uses the years since the Amendment was in place. Though not reported here, the squared term of this variable enters in to all of the estimations insignificantly and alternatively defined dummy variables for different groupings of years since the Amendment has been passed all enter in significantly with a similar sign and the coefficients are increasing in magnitude as the number of years increases.

5.2. Robustness checks

Tables 1 and 2 also report results from a series of robustness checks on the effect of the Amendments on suicide rates. Columns 3 and 7 (in Table 1) demonstrate that the results are robust to the inclusion of state specific linear time trends for both female and male suicide rates respectively.21 Though not reported here, the results are also robust to simply including a linear time trend. Columns 3 and 7 of Table 2, demonstrate that the effect of Amendments on relative female to male

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21 The results are also robust to include state specific quadratic time trends. Refer to Table A5 in the Appendix.
Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%.

Cultural controls include population shares of Muslims, Hindus, Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes. Economic controls include literacy rates, relative female to male literacy rates, food prices, state income per capita, rural food production, yields, the incidence of floods or droughts, average rainfall, banks per capita, urbanization, and share of state expenditure on health, development and education.

Table 1
Suicide rates and female inheritance – OLS estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women commission</td>
<td>State specific linear time trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 2 years</td>
<td>0.01 (0.005)***</td>
<td>0.01 (0.004)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 3 years</td>
<td>0.005 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 5 years</td>
<td>−0.0006 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ. controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%.

Table 2
Relative female and male suicide rates and female inheritance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Female/Male</th>
<th>Female/Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women commission</td>
<td>State specific linear time trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 2 years</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.008)***</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.009)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 3 years</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.01)</td>
<td>−0.03 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 5 years</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>−0.001 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment — 7 years</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%.

suicide rates are also robust to the inclusion of state specific linear time trends.

A key concern with our empirical strategy is that the state specific Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act are correlated with other law changes which could impact relative female to male suicide rates or family conflict. Other key laws in India which pertain directly to women are: the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Child Marriage Act, The Prevention of Sati, The Hindu Marriage Act, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, and the State Commission for Women Act. Of all of these acts, it is only the last which varies at the state level over our time period of consideration. All of the other Acts, were primarily implemented at the national level, and prior to our period of study (i.e., before 1967), or in the case of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, which was enacted in 2005, after our period of study.22 The National Commission for Women was set up as a statutory body in 1992 under the National Commission for Women Act of 1990 to review the constitutional and legal safeguards for women. In accord with the national mandate, each state subsequently sets up their own Commission for Women. The year in which these committees were formed at the state level varied by year: the first was Maharashtra in 1993 and later ones included Tamil Nadu in 2008 and lastly Haryana in 2012. The estimations in Columns 2 and 6 of Tables 1 and 2, demonstrate that our key results are robust to the inclusion of a variable which is equal to one if this Commission is in place in a given state and year and equal to zero otherwise. In general, we find no significant effects of this variable on female and male suicide rates or the relative rate. This also held true if we only included the Commission variable and not the Amendment variable into the regressions. These state level commissions primarily provide recommendations for legal reform. Unless a change in the legal status of women is actually legislated, we should not expect that the simple existence of these commissions should directly impact family conflict and hence suicide rates of men and women, as is confirmed in the data.

A final consideration is the political reforms which have been in force since the 73rd Amendment to the Indian constitution, which mandated female representation in local governments. Recent work by Iyer et al. (2012) has demonstrated that this increase in female representation in local governments has lead to a significant rise in documented crimes (primarily kidnappings and rapes) against women. As a check on their results, they looked to crimes where they thought reporting bias is likely to be less like murders and suicides. Their hypothesis is that if reporting bias is not strong, then the reporting of these types of crimes should not be affected by increased female political presence. Indeed, they find no effects — that is, there is no significant relationship between female political representation and female and male suicide rates.

In general there does not seem to be evidence that other laws, which are aimed at the rights of women, are confounding our key results. A further concern is alternative laws which might be correlated with the Amendments, and which might impact suicide rates more generally, such as those which affect poverty. As stated earlier in Section 3, given the differences in traditional schools of Hindu law, it makes sense that these more liberal states which underwent the Amendments did so.

22 There were some state level amendments to the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 in the northern states (Haryana, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, West Bengal, and Orissa) in 1975 and 1976. These amendments did not alter the act substantially, rather pointed out clarifications regarding the definition of dowry and the exact amount of fines imposed. Though not reported here, our results are robust to the inclusion of these state level amendments to the Dowry Prohibition Act.
before the others. However, there is no systematic explanation for the exact year that each state chose to implement the Amendment. For a given state in India, there are often more than forty enactments passed every year. If we restrict ourselves to only those which are applicable to the whole state, at least five are typically passed in any given year. For our five key states of interest (who imposed early Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act), there are no other enactments that occurred simultaneously in each of these states. That is, Kerala passed the Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 1976. That same year in Kerala, a tax on luxuries in hotels and lodging was imposed, as well as enactments regarding pension payments to members of the legislature, restrictions on the supply of paddy and rice to Travancore Palace, and the dissolution of municipal co-op pharmacies. None of these enactments that occurred alongside the Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in Kerala in 1976 also occurred alongside the corresponding Amendments in the other states in their respective years. That is to say, there is no specific law change (other than the Amendment) that happened specifically in 1976 in Kerala, 1986 in Andhra Pradesh, 1989 in Tamil Nadu, and in 1994 in Maharashtra and Karnataka. This was also the case for enactments imposed a couple of years prior to these dates in all of the states. Hence, there is no evidence of a particular enactment that was passed at the same time as the Hindu Succession Act in our different states of interest.

To confirm this, we ran a series of placebo tests. Columns 4 and 7 of Tables 1 and 2 report the estimation results from these tests. In these estimations we include additional dummy variables, denoted $A_{st} − 2$, $A_{st} − 3$, $A_{st} − 5$, and $A_{st} − 7$ which are equal to 1 for all years greater or equal to $t − 2$, $t − 3$, $t − 5$, and $t − 7$ respectively if state $s$ passed the Amendment Act in year $t$ and zero otherwise. If it is indeed the effects of the Amendment that we are picking up in our estimation of Eq. (10), then we should expect that the estimated coefficient on these additional dummy variables to be insignificant in the estimations. We see from the results that this is the case: the effects of the Amendment are only significant for the years when the Amendment was actually passed, and not significant if we pretend the Amendment was passed instead 2, 3, 5, or 7 years prior. This held true for a number of

![Fig. 2. Effect of years of exposure.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>First-stage amendment</th>
<th>Female suicides</th>
<th>Male suicides</th>
<th>Female–Male suicides</th>
<th>Female/Male suicides</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.10 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)**</td>
<td>−0.45 (0.13)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft left</td>
<td>−0.13 (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-stat on instruments</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%.
other empirical specifications, where the placebo years are differently defined, or if we enter the different dummy variables, $A_{st-2}$, $A_{st-3}$, $A_{st-5}$, and $A_{st-7}$, into the estimations independently instead of all together.

An additional set of estimations, reported in Table A4 in the Appendix, excludes the state of Kerala.23 This state is distinct for many reasons, not only because it was the first to pass the Amendment Act but also it has the highest overall suicide rates in the country. Moreover it is an anomaly in India with regard to the status of women, along many positive dimensions. The second set of estimations in Table A4 excludes the state of Maharashtra where there have been a noteworthy number of cotton farmer suicides in recent years (Hebous and Klonner (2014)). Finally, the third set of estimations excludes the three states (Bihar, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh), where the average suicide rates for both men and women have been decreasing through time. In addition, these three states have the lowest overall suicide rates in the country.

5.3. Instrumental variables estimations

In the regression estimates presented so far, there is possibly still a concern that unobservables determine both suicides and property legislation. Given the evidence presented in the prior section, there does not appear to be any alternative policy changes that could be confounding our results. However, there is still possibly the concern that the Amendments are correlated with some unobservable factor which also determines suicide rates or household conflict, like a poverty shock. This does seem unlikely given the variation we are exploiting here. Again, there would have to be some unobservable factor which is specifically relevant in 1976 for Kerala, 1986 for Andhra Pradesh, 1989 for Tamil Nadu, and in 1994 for both Maharashtra and Karnataka. This being said, to address this issue we attempt to instrument for these legislations. We follow the strategy of Besley and Burgess (2000) who conjecture that different groupings in the state legislature enact different Amendments and Acts. Specifically, we use the seat shares of different political groups, lagged by one period. These are constructed from the data from the Election Commission of India who record the number of seats won by different parties in each state election (see the Appendix for details).

The first stage estimation results are presented in the first column of Table 3 below. It shows that state parties and the Congress party were more likely than Hindu parties to pass Amendments to the Inheritance Law while the soft left parties were less likely to pass them (the F-test on the instruments is about 10). Columns 2 to 5 show that, controlling for cultural and economic factors, the results of Tables 1 and 2 remain robust to this instrumenting strategy. That is, the Amendments increased both female and male suicide rates, but increased that of males by more, where the magnitude of the coefficients in these IV estimations are larger than those in the OLS estimations.

5.4. Alternative property rights measures

In this section we consider an alternative measure of property rights for women. The previous estimations pertain to variation across states and time with regard to legislating Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act which granted sons and daughters similar rights to joint family property. However, there are additional laws which govern land ownership in India which pertain to tenancy rights and landholding restrictions.24 Agarwal (1995) discusses the gender inequalities implicit in these state-level land and tenancy reform acts. The succession rules relating to land held under tenancy are different than the personal laws. In a subset of states, devolution of tenancy land is only to male heirs. In other states, daughters and sisters are recognized but come very low in the order of heirs. In the remaining states, personal law applies to tenancy land and women have some rights over the land. Landholding laws are defined by the maximum landholding per family unit and the states vary in their definition of family. In some states, the family constitutes the cultivator and his/her spouse, sons, and unmarried daughters. In other states, the family unit includes all children (married or not). In many states, adult sons receive special consideration and the parental household can hold additional land on account of each adult son.

23 In Table A5 in the Appendix we also present a set of estimations which excludes the state of Kerala and also includes state specific linear time trends.

24 The Hindu Succession Act covers only owned agricultural land and does not cover land stemming from tenancy rights.
other states, adult sons, count as a separate unit and are entitled to hold land in their own right. In many of these enactments, unmarried adult daughters receive no recognition at all, they do not count either as part of the family unit or as a separate unit and in other states, married daughters do not receive recognition.

Using this state level variation in the legal treatment of women, we construct alternative measures of pro-women property reforms. In particular, we use the cumulative indexes of state-level landholding and tenancy reforms used by Besley and Burgess (2000). We then interact these measures with an index which captures the degree to which these reforms favored women in accord with Agarwal (1995).

Our key variables of interest are represented by $L_{st}$, $T_{st}$, $L_{st} \times T_{st}$ and $F_{t} \times T_{st}$. $L_{st}$ is a cumulative index of state-level landholding reforms, and $T_{st}$ is a cumulative index of tenancy reforms. Both of these are constructed from the data used by Besley and Burgess (2000), see the Appendix for details. $L_{st}$ is an index of the degree to which these landholding reforms favored women in accord with Agarwal (1995). $T_{st} = 1$ if married and unmarried daughters receive no recognition; $T_{st} = 2$ if married but not unmarried daughters receive recognition; and $T_{st} = 3$ if unmarried and married daughters receive recognition. $F_{t}$ is an index of the degree to which these tenancy reforms favored women in accord with Agarwal (1995). $F_{t} = 1$ if the devolution of tenancy land is only to male heirs; $F_{t} = 2$ if daughters and sisters are recognized but come very low in the order of heirs; $F_{t} = 3$ if personal law applies to tenancy land and women have some rights over the land. $\partial_{st}$ and $\delta_{st}$ are the state and year fixed effects respectively, and $\delta_{tst}$ is a regression disturbance term clustered at the state level.

We first illustrate the effect of land reform with a simple plot. Fig. 3 plots the suicide rates (male in panel (a) and female in panel (b)) on the cumulative land and tenancy reforms ($L_{st} + T_{st}$) depending on whether these reforms also benefit women (defined as $L_{st} + F_{t} > 3$) or not. We see clearly a positive correlation between suicide rates and cumulative land reform when these reforms also benefit women but not when these reforms predominantly benefit men.

We then look at these effects controlling for state and year fixed effects as well as our set of state and time varying controls $X_{st}$. Specifically, we estimate:

$$S_{st} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}X_{st} + \alpha_{2}L_{st} + \alpha_{3}F_{t} + \alpha_{4}T_{st} + \alpha_{5}F_{t} \times T_{st} + \delta_{st} + \epsilon_{st}. \quad (13)$$

The estimation results of Eq. (13) are reported in Table 4. We see that a similar picture emerges when considering these alternative measures of pro-women reforms. While the overall cumulative landholding and tenancy reforms reduce both male and female suicide rates, the effect varies widely depending on whether these reforms favor men or women. Landholding reforms that benefit mainly (rate 1 on the pro-women scale) reduce female suicides by 4 (per 100,000) and male suicides by 8 (per 100,000), whereas landholding reforms that rate 2 on our pro-women scale only reduces male and female suicide by 1 (per 100,000). Similarly, the most pro-male tenancy reforms (which rate 1 on our pro-women scale) prevent 1 female and 2 male suicides (per 100,000), while tenancy reforms that rate 2 on our pro-women scale have no effect on the suicide rates. In both cases, the effects of the interaction terms ($\alpha_{5}$ and $\alpha_{6}$) are positive and significant in all estimations and larger for male suicide rates. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 present the estimates of the effects that these pro-female land reform measures have on the relative suicide rate of women to men.

### Table 4

Suicides and female land reforms — OLS estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Female suicides</th>
<th>Female suicides</th>
<th>Male suicides</th>
<th>Male suicides</th>
<th>Female–Male suicides</th>
<th>Female–Male suicides</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landholding acts</td>
<td>−0.09 (0.008)**</td>
<td>−0.07 (0.009)**</td>
<td>−0.20 (0.03)**</td>
<td>−0.15 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.08 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.32 (0.10)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenancy acts</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.006)**</td>
<td>−0.02 (0.004)**</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.007)**</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.005)**</td>
<td>0.20 (0.08)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female + Landholding acts</td>
<td>0.04 (0.004)**</td>
<td>0.03 (0.004)**</td>
<td>0.09 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.07 (0.02)**</td>
<td>−0.04 (0.01)**</td>
<td>−0.12 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female + Tenancy acts</td>
<td>0.01 (0.003)**</td>
<td>0.01 (0.003)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.004)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.006)**</td>
<td>−0.01 (0.003)**</td>
<td>−0.09 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%. * refers to significance at the 13% level. In this final estimation the sample is restricted to the years 1967–1992 (the original Besley–Burgess data set), for all of the other estimations the sample is the years 1967–2000.

### Table 5

Suicides and Female Landholding Acts — IV-2SLS Estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>First-stage landholding</th>
<th>First-stage landholding</th>
<th>First-stage female Landhold.</th>
<th>Female suicides</th>
<th>Male suicides</th>
<th>Female–Male suicides</th>
<th>Female–Male suicides</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landholding acts</td>
<td>3.20 (0.65)**</td>
<td>−0.07 (0.04)*</td>
<td>−0.19 (0.07)**</td>
<td>0.04 (0.01)**</td>
<td>0.10 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.12 (0.04)**</td>
<td>0.72 (0.45)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female + Landhold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard left</td>
<td>3.03 (0.50)**</td>
<td>−0.30 (0.18)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft left</td>
<td>−0.87 (0.18)**</td>
<td>−0.58 (0.18)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State parties</td>
<td>−0.17 (0.11)</td>
<td>−0.86 (0.45)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-stat on Instruments</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%. † refers to significance at the 13% level. In this final estimation the sample is restricted to the years 1967–1992 (the original Besley–Burgess data set), for all of the other estimations the sample is the years 1967–2000.
measured as the difference \((S_{1t} - S_{Et})\) and also the ratio \(\left(\frac{S_{1t}}{S_{Et}}\right)\). Consistent with our earlier estimations, we see that landholding and tenancy reforms which favor men (women) increase (decrease) relative female to male suicide rates.

5.4.1. Instrumental variables estimations

Finally, we also estimate an IV specification of Eq. (13). In a two-stage estimation, where the second-stage estimates are represented by Eq. (13), we need to instrument for both, the cumulative indexes of reforms, \(L_{st}\) and \(T_{st}\), as done in Besley and Burgess (2000), and also their interaction with the female oriented policy indices, \(F_{Ls}\) and \(F_{Ts}\). To this end, as recommended by Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 191), we first estimate the following:

\[
L_{st} = \beta_0 + \delta_t X_{st} + \eta_t Z_{st-1} + \pi_s + \alpha_t + \mu_{st} \quad (14)
\]

\[
T_{st} = \theta_0 + \theta_t X_{st} + \theta_t Z_{st-1} + \varphi_t + \alpha_t + \nu_{st} \quad (15)
\]

where \(X_{st}\) and \(Z_{st-1}\) are the same variables defined in Eq. (12). We then use the predicted values, \(L_{st}\) and \(T_{st}\), from Eqs. (14) and (15) respectively, and their interactions with the female policy index, \(F_{Ls}\) and \(F_{Ts}\), as instruments in the four first-stage estimations of \(L_{st}\), \(T_{st}\), \(F_{Ls}\) and \(F_{Ts}\) in a conventional 2SLS procedure:

\[
L_{st} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_t X_{st} + \lambda_t Z_{st-1} + \lambda_t F_{Ls} + \phi_t + \tau_s + \gamma_t + \xi_{st} \quad (16)
\]

\[
F_{Ls} = \rho_0 + \rho_t X_{st} + \rho_t Z_{st-1} + \rho_t F_{Ls} + \omega_t + \phi_t + \zeta_{st} \quad (17)
\]

Table 7
Suicide rates from family conflict and female inheritance — OLS estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Suicide rate from family conflict</th>
<th>Suicide rate from other causes</th>
<th>Proportion suicides family conflict (all suicides)</th>
<th>Proportion suicides family conflict (cause known)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>0.006 (0.003)**</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.19 (0.08)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amendment</td>
<td>0.01 (0.004)**</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.11)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.06 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>controls</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Notes: All regressions have state and year controls. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%. 25

25 These studies are typically conducted by health care workers and rely on verbal autopsy data. Soman et al. (2009), for example, performed a cohort study where villages were visited repeatedly for five years. Each reported death was investigated by local health care workers as well as a physician who conducted a validation study of each death and a detailed inquiry of household and village members.
Table 8
Domestic violence and female inheritance (NFHS) — probit estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Whole Sample</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Amended States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposed to amendment</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.09 (0.02)**</td>
<td>0.08 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.13 (0.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>60,687</td>
<td>51,735</td>
<td>7610</td>
<td>1221</td>
<td>23,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable equals to one if a wife has been beaten by her husband and zero otherwise. All regressions have state fixed effects. Individual and household controls include: year of marriage, education, age, and occupation of both wives and their husbands; caste and religion of wives; household location (rural or urban); and household durable good ownership. Exposed to Amendment is a dummy variable equal to one if the woman was married after the Amendment had been passed in her state and equal to zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes significance at the 10% level, double for 5%, and triple for 1%.

The broad class of “family problems” accounts for the single largest cause of suicides irrespective of gender in the national level data. More specifically, this category refers to quarrels with spouse, parents, or in-laws and accounts for the majority of suicides among the 15 to 44 age group for both males and females. Illness is the second most important cause associated with suicides (this does not typically refer to mental illness but more commonly to a serious (likely terminal) illness) and accounts for the majority of suicides for individuals aged 60 and over. Other causes like poverty, bankruptcy, and dowry disputes are cited as the causes of only 2 to 3% of suicides respectively. Again, these relationships are also found in the micro-level studies which point to marital disharmony as a main cause of suicide (Mohanty et al. 2006, Gouda and Rao, 2008).

Given that the majority of suicides seem to be due to family conflict, we now test to see if the effects of the Amendments on suicide rates, found in the earlier section, are determining this particular cause of suicides. To this end, Table 7 (column 1) reports results from analogous estimations to Eq. (10), where the dependent variable is instead the suicide rate from family problems for females and males. We see that, as before, the Amendment Acts (which increased inheritance rights for women) significantly increase both male and female suicide rates, where the estimated coefficient is larger for males. Column 2 of Table 7 reports results from analogous estimations where the dependent variable is instead the suicide rate from family problems for females and males. We see that, as before, the Amendment Acts significantly increase the proportion of suicides due to family problems for both males and females. Column 3 reports this proportion, relative to all suicides, by gender. We see that, consistent with the previous findings, the Amendment Acts significantly increase the proportion of suicides due to family problems for both males and females. Column 4 reports this proportion relative to total suicides only where the cause is known. We see that the main results persist and that the estimated effects are large, where the increase in the proportion of suicides attributed to family problems is more than 25% for both men and women.

The fact that it is male and female suicides caused by family problems and marital disharmony that have increased with the Amendment Acts, we conjecture that increasing female property rights increased conflict within household and that this increased conflict resulted in more suicides among both men and women. We now turn to an alternative data set to test this conjecture more directly. We use individual level data from the recent National Family Health Survey of India (NFHS-3 collected in 2005), which comprises detailed information on violence against women collected from married women aged 15 to 49.

Importantly the early Amendments to the Hindu Succession Act do not apply to women who were married prior to the commencement of the Amendments. For these women, their inheritance rights are dictated by the laws in place prior to the Amendment (refer to Agarwal (1995) for details). We can exploit this application of the law to uncover the effects of the Amendment on individual women within a give state. That is, we can compare outcomes of women who were married before the Amendment to those who were married after the Amendment.

In particular, we estimate the following:

$$Y_{i,s} = \psi_0 + \psi_1 X_{i,s} + \psi_2 A_{is} + m_{is} + \alpha_5 + \epsilon_{is},$$

where $Y_{i,s}$ is a domestic violence outcome variable for an individual female $i$ residing in state $s$, $Y_{i,s}$ takes on a value of 1 if a given female $i$ (residing in state $s$) has been physically abused by her husband, and zero otherwise. Roughly 28% of women in our sample have been beaten by their husbands. $X_{i,s}$ is a vector of individual and household control variables which include: education, age, and occupation of wives and their husbands; caste and religion of wives; household location (rural or urban); and household durable good ownership. Table A2 in the Appendix presents summary statistics on these variables. $m_{is}$ is the year of marriage and $\alpha_5$ are the state fixed effects. Our key independent variable of interest $A_{is}$, is equal to 1 for those women who reside in states where the Amendment has been passed and they were married after the Amendment was passed. It is equal to zero otherwise. That is, $A_{is}$ is equal to zero for those women in these states who were married before the Amendment was passed and for all women who reside in states where no Amendment was passed prior to the year 2005.

Table 8 reports the estimation results of Eq. (20). Using the whole sample, Column 1 demonstrates that, consistent with our conjecture, the effect of the Amendments (measured by $A_{is}$) is positive and significant on the probability that a wife is beaten by her husband. Recall that the Hindu Succession Act only applies to the Hindu population. Therefore, we should see no effects of the Amendment for other religious groups. We test this in Columns 2 and 4 in Table 8. We see that the significant positive effects of the Amendment on the incidence of domestic violence are only relevant for Hindus — there are no significant positive effects for Muslims or Christians. The final column demonstrates that this result is robust if we just limit the sample to those states which passed the Amendment. These results suggest that, increasing property rights in favor of women, can lead to more violence against women.

A relevant consideration regarding this interpretation of these results is that domestic violence is very likely to be vastly underreported (refer to Alderman et al., forthcoming). Therefore an additional contributing factor might be that the amendments also empowered women to be more forthcoming with regard to reporting violence.
6. Discussion

6.1. Other possible explanations

Our data do not allow us to directly test whether the above explanation is the actual channel through which improvements in property rights increased suicide rates in India. Other explanations are possible. For instance, it might be that conflict between brothers and sisters, not husbands and wives, increased as a result of the reforms. This would not change the way we think about this theoretically, as we can use the above framework to model bargaining between a sister and a brother over assets. However, we think that it is less likely to be a main explanation as in micro-studies of suicides mentioned in Section 4 marital disharmony was cited as a main trigger while dispute among siblings was not.

Another possibility is that, following the reform, some men pushed women to suicide to obtain their resources. Note though that this would only explain the increased female suicide and therefore needs to be combined with another explanation.27

6.2. Policy implications

In terms of policy implications, we are certainly not recommending to keep inheritance rights unequal between men and women. Though our paper highlights some of the negative implications of women empowerment, it is important to stress that, as in the model presented in the previous section, we do expect that women are made ex-ante better off by more equitable property rights.

What our model suggests is policies that decrease the cost of conflict by easing separations for instance. In the US, Stevenson and Wolters (2006) found that states that adopted more liberal laws permitting "unilateral divorce" reported an 8 to 16% decline in female suicide, roughly a 30% decline in domestic violence for both men and women, and a 10% decline in females murdered by their partners. In India, the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill in 2012 made divorce proceedings for unhappy couples easier and women-friendly, but stigma as well as norms in terms of child custody and alimony still make separation extremely hard in practice.

7. Conclusion

Our paper has demonstrated a positive relationship between better property rights for women and male suicide rates in India. We conjecture that increased marital conflict could be the main channel through which improving female property rights raise suicides. Our findings are consistent with the sociological literature, which emphasizes how increased gender equality can accentuate tensions and distress within households — leading to a greater incidence of male and female suicides. By contrast, the economic literature on behavior in the household, has mainly focused on the positive effects of increasing women's outside options. By explicitly considering costly conflict in the household, we demonstrate some more subtle features of increased bargaining power of women.

Of course, from a policy perspective, one would never want to advocate reducing gender equality on account of its link to suicide rates. Rather, it highlights the importance of providing help for women seeking to leave unhappy marriages or escape violence. Moreover, the empirical accounts from industrialized countries suggest that this dire consequence of increased opportunities for women may be mitigated once societal institutions adjust and there is a greater acceptance of the new gender roles.

Appendix A

A.1. Data sources

A.1.1. Dependent variables

Suicide numbers by gender and cause come from National Crime Records Bureau of India.

A.1.2. Instrumental variables

Political variables come from the Election Commission of India.

A.1.3. Cultural controls

Population, religion, and caste data come from decennial census were published in the Annual Statistical Abstract of India. Variables are interpolated between censuses.

A.1.4. Economic controls

State expenditure data, rainfall, drought and flood information comes from the EOPP Indian States Data Base at STICERD, London School of Economics.

Bank availability come from the Burgess and Pande (2005) data set.

A.2. Variable definitions

A.2.1. State dummies

States included: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.

A.2.2. Year dummies

Years covered 1967–2004

A.2.3. Female inheritance amendments

\[ A_j = 1 \text{ for } t \geq 1976 \text{ for Kerala}; \quad A_j = 1 \text{ for } t \geq 1986 \text{ for Andhra Pradesh}; \quad A_j = 1 \text{ for } t \geq 1989 \text{ for Tamil Nadu}; \quad A_j = 1 \text{ for } t \geq 1994 \text{ for Maharashtra and Karnataka}; \quad A_j = 0 \text{ otherwise.} \]

A.2.4. Land reform indexes

\[ L_{it} = \text{ the cumulative number state-level legislations regarding landholdings. These include legislations which implemented ceilings on landholdings (Type 3 in the Besley–Burgess data); and acts that consolidated disparate landholdings (Type 4 in the Besley–Burgess data).} \]

\[ T_{it} = \text{ the cumulative number of state-level legislations regarding tenancy rights. These include acts which regulate tenancy contracts, abolish tenancy, and transfer ownership to tenants (Type 1 in the Besley–Burgess data); and acts which attempt to abolish intermediaries (Type 2 in the Besley–Burgess data). In accord with the Besley–Burgess data, amendments to the acts count as new legislations.} \]

\[ F_{it} = \text{ an index which increases in the rights women have regarding tenancy acts. Using the information in from Table 2 in Agarwal (1995), we code this:} \]

\[ F_{it} = 1 \text{ if the devolution of tenancy land is only to male heirs (Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Haryana, Himachel Pradesh);} \]

\[ F_{it} = 2 \text{ if daughters and sisters are recognized but come very low in the order of heirs (Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Orissa, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu);} \]

\[ F_{it} = 3 \text{ if personal law applies to tenancy land and women have some rights over the land (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh).} \]
$F_{Ls}$ is an index which increases in the rights women have regarding landholding rights in states. Using this: $F_{Ls} = 1$ if married and unmarried daughters receive no recognition (Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana); $F_{Ls} = 2$ if married but not unmarried daughters receive recognition (Bihar, Assam, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa); $F_{Ls} = 3$ if unmarried and married daughters receive recognition (Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal).

**A.2.5. Political variables**

$Z_{es} = 1$ includes the proportion of seats in the state legislatures (Vidhan Sabha) held by Hard Left (Communist Party of India; Communist Party of India Marxist Parties); Soft Left (Indian National Congress Socialist Parties); Congress (Indian National Congress; Indian National Congress Urs); and State Parties (Telugu Desam; Assam Gana Parishad; Shiv Sena; Utkal Congress; Shiromani Akali Dal; Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam).

**A.2.6. Domestic violence variables**

$Y_{ib}$ reflects the dependent variable of whether a wife has been beaten by her husband, it takes on a value of 1 if a woman has ever been physically abused by her husband.

**A.2.7. Female inheritance amendment (individual level regressions)**

Let $A_{s}$ denote the year that the Amendment was passed in state $s$ (i.e., $A_{s} = 1976$ for Kerala; $A_{s} = 1986$ for Andhra Pradesh; $A_{s} = 1989$ for Tamil Nadu; $A_{s} = 1994$ for Maharashtra and Karnataka). Then we define $A_{s}$ as follows. $A_{s} = 1$ if year married $\geq A_{s}$; or $A_{s} = 0$ if year married $< A_{s}$. $A_{s} = 0$ for all of the states where no Amendment was passed prior to the year 2005.

**A.3. Summary statistics**

**Table A1** Summary statistics (across all years and states).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female suicide rate</td>
<td>0.073 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male suicide rate</td>
<td>0.11 (0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female suicide rate–male suicide rate</td>
<td>1990 (8.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female suicide rate/male suicide rate</td>
<td>0.74 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus (share of population)</td>
<td>0.827 (0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims (share of population)</td>
<td>0.150 (0.173)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule tribes (share of population)</td>
<td>0.074 (0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schedule castes (share of population)</td>
<td>0.151 (0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
<td>0.58 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural product per capita (log)</td>
<td>7.144 (0.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural food product per capita</td>
<td>0.307 (0.273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yields</td>
<td>30.283 (17.982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food shock</td>
<td>0.261 (0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>0.118 (0.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>0.113 (0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly rainfall</td>
<td>335.826 (256.696)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of health expenditure in state income</td>
<td>0.012 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of development expenditure in state income</td>
<td>0.109 (0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of education expenditure in state income</td>
<td>0.035 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks per capita</td>
<td>0.057 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population share</td>
<td>0.234 (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop of seats won by state parties</td>
<td>0.114 (0.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop of seats won by congress</td>
<td>0.418 (0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop of seats won by hard left</td>
<td>0.085 (0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop of seats won by soft left</td>
<td>0.02 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Suicide rates are defined per 1000 individuals in a given state and year. Yields are total agricultural output per area sown. Food shock is equal to one if a food shortage occurred in a given state and year, and zero otherwise. Similar dummy variables are defined for the occurrence of a flood or drought.

**A.4. Other estimations**

**Table A2** Summary statistics — individual level data (NFHS).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beaten by husband</td>
<td>0.28 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife — age</td>
<td>29.16 (9.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife — no education</td>
<td>0.32 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife — housewife</td>
<td>0.60 (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife — year of marriage</td>
<td>1990 (6.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband — no education</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband — cultivator</td>
<td>0.22 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>0.25 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>0.72 (0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST</td>
<td>0.17 (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>0.14 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.33 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of durables owned</td>
<td>2.71 (1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>61,938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. SC, ST, and OBC refer to the caste groupings (Scheduled caste, Scheduled tribe, and Other backward castes). The excluded category is the higher ranked castes in the Indian social hierarchy.

**Table A3** Suicide rates with years of amendment — OLS estimations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years amendment</td>
<td>0.002 (0.004)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear time trend</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A4** Suicide rates and female inheritance — robustness tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years amendment</td>
<td>0.001 (0.005)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A5** Suicide rates and female inheritance — robustness tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean (s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years amendment</td>
<td>0.002 (0.004)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>